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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JESSE RODRIGUEZ GARCIA, 
Defendant/Appellant. Case No. 20040610-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty by a jury of one 
count of Child Abuse, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
U.C.A. §76-5-109(3)(a). On June 28, 2004, judgment was entered 
by the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin sentencing the defendant to a 
term of 365 days at the Weber County Jail. On July 19, 2004, the 
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. This Court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3. 
STATE OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE ONE. Was there sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict that the defendant was Guilty of Child Abuse, a 
class A misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. §76-5-109(3)(a)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. When challenging the sufficiency of 
the evidence, "the standard of review is that the evidence and 
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the reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict." State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). Under this analysis, 
a conviction can only be overturned where the evidence "is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was 
convicted.'" State v. Holqate, 2000 UT 74, II 18, 10 P.3d 346 
(quoting State v. Dunn,850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). 
ISSUE TWO. Was the Defendant denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I 
Sections Seven and Twelve of the Utah Constitution when his trial 
attorney failed to pursue Defendant's claim that a witness lied 
in testifying that he administered the Defendant's Miranda 
warning? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The appellate court must determine as a 
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right 
to effective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 688, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)
 f the United States Supreme 
Court articulated a two-part test to determine whether counsel 
was ineffective. Under the Strickland test, an individual has 
been denied the effective assistance of counsel if (1) counsel's 
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performance was deficient below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 
203, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668f 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
an\d to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
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process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 7 Due Process. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12 Rights of Accused Persons. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
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determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute• Nothing in this constitution shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or 
rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Utah Statutes 
Utah Code 76-5-109; 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is under 18 years of age. 
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection 
(2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109.1. 
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a 
child which impairs the physical condition of the child, 
including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or 
welfare and which is not a serious physical injury as defined in 
Subsection (1)(d). 
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set 
of injuries which seriously impairs the child's health, or which 
involves physical torture or causes serious emotional harm to the 
child, or which Involves a substantial risk of death to the 
child, including: 
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(i) fracture of any bone or bones; 
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the 
brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or causing the child's 
head to impact with an object or surface; 
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or 
those 
caused by placing a hot object upon the skin or body of the 
child; 
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined 
in Section 76-1-601; 
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted 
by the same person, either at the same time or on different 
occasions; 
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body; 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe 
emotional harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or 
severe impairment of the child's ability to function; 
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, 
limb, or organ; 
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even 
if resuscitation is successful following the conduct; or 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to 
thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical 
injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes or 
permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child 
is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a 
felony of the second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third 
degree; or 
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(c) if done with criminal negligencef the offense is a class A 
misdemeanor, 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, 
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits 
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an 
offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class 
A misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; 
or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C 
misdemeanor. 
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with 
treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer, in lieu of 
medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and practices of 
an established church or religious denomination of which the 
parent or legal guardian is a member or adherent shall not, for 
that reason alone, be deemed to have committed an offense under 
this section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Garcia was charged in a single count Information dated 
September 18, 2001, with the offense of Child Abuse, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-109(3)(a). A 
jury trial was held on January 9,2002, the Honorable Parley R. 
Baldwin presiding. After the one-day jury trial, the jury 
returned with a verdict of ''guilty." 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to 
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the jury verdictf is as follows: 
Reyna Hassenrik ("Hassenrik"), the child's mother, testified 
that her son, J.S., was born December 19, 1996. In September 
2001 Hassenrik lived with Garcia, with J.S., in an apartment in 
Ogden, Utah. As of September 17, 2001, she and J.S. had been 
living with Garcia for about one and a half weeks. Trial TR p 18. 
On September 17, 2001, she, J.S. and Garcia sat down to 
dinner, J.S. didn't like the "looks of it" and he "started to 
pout." Trial TR p 18. J.S. continued to pout and "then he 
started to cry." Trial TR p 19. Garcia told "told him to be 
quiet and eat his dinner." Id. J.S. continued to cry and 
Garcia "grabbed him by the arm and took him in his room." Trial 
TR p 20. 
The testimony described the apartment as not "very big." 
Trial TR p 21. It had one big bedroom and one little bedroom. 
It had "the table area where you eat and the kitchen and the 
bathroom and a balcony on the outside." Hassenrik, Garcia and 
J.S. were eating in the kitchen area on the evening of September 
17, 2001. The bedroom is "not far away" from the kitchen area. 
Id. 
Hassenrik did not follow Garcia and J.S. into the bedroom 
initially. Garcia closed to door to the bedroom and Hassenrik 
did not observe what took place in the bedroom. Trial TR p 22. 
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She testified that she did hear noises and at trial she made 
slapping sounds. Trial TR p 22. She testified that she could 
hear "him crying and screaming." Trial TR p 23. She "knew that 
he was in trouble" and that "he [Garcia] told him to sit there 
and be quiet and calm down until he can come out and eat his 
dinner." Id. 
J.S. returned to the table, but he didn't want to eat. 
Garcia took J.S. back in the room. Id. This second time, 
Hassenrik went "over to the couch because I was scared and I was 
listening to what was going on." Trial TR p 24. She heard more 
slapping sounds. She then "went in there and told him to stop." 
Id. 
Hassenrik testified that she didn't see anything when she 
entered the room and that Garcia told her to "go out, that he 
would take care of it." Trial TR p 25. J.S.'s "face was red and 
he was crying hard." Id. 
Hassenrik testified that she "didn't do anything" when she 
saw J.S. on the bed crying, but that she left the room and sat 
on a couch outside of the bedroom. Trial TR p 27. J.S. 
remained in the room with Garcia for a "couple of minutes," then 
J.S. went back to the table and Garcia came out of the bedroom. 
Garcia told J.S. again to eat his dinner. J.S. started crying, 
"mom, no, I don't want to eat it." Trial TR p 28. Hassenrik 
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testified that Garcia then took J.S. back into the bedroom. 
Hassenrik was in the kitchen doing the dishes, when she heard 
"the belt hitting my child." Trial TR. P 29. Hassenrik went 
into the bedroom and observed Garcia "smacking him with the belt 
on his butt. I told him to stop and he told me to leave the 
room." J.S. 's shorts were pulled down, and there was nothing 
covering his buttocks. Id. Garcia had a belt. Trial TR p 30. 
Hassenrik left the room and called a friend, Maxine. Trial TR p 
31. 
Hassenrik identified photographs of a child's legs with 
marks on them to be J.S.'s legs, that she recognized his shorts, 
that J.S. had been wearing those shorts on September 17, 2001, 
that the marks appearing on the photographs on J.S. 's legs were 
not present before J.S. went into the bedroom with Garcia. Trial 
TR p 32. She also testified that she saw the buckle of the belt 
Garcia struck J.S. with, and she identified a photograph of the 
belt on the floor of the bedroom. Trial TR p 33. She also 
identified the belt as belonging to Garcia. Jd. 
Joseph War testified that he is a friend of Hassenrik's who 
received a telephone call from Maxine on September 17, 2001. He 
went to Hassenrikfs residence on September 17 because "she needed 
a ride to leave the residence." Trial TR p 38. He didn't knock 
on the door, but understood that Hassenrik would come outside. 
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He waited for approximately one hour. Trial TR p 40. He 
testified that he was "worried about her," that he went to the 
door to see if he could hear anything because he saw various 
lights come off and on, he saw an individual at the apartment, 
and he only heard silence, so "got worried so I called the 
police." Trial TR p 40. War was at the apartment when the police 
arrived. Id. 
Sgt. Roger L. Hunt of South Ogden Police Department 
responded to War's call. Trial TR p 41. Hunt testified that law 
enforcement was contacted by an individual by the name of Joseph 
War. Trial TR p 42. After speaking with War, Hunt went to the 
apartment, made contact with Garcia, and asked to speak with 
Hassenrik. Trial TR p 43. Hunt did speak with Hassenrik who 
"explained there was an incident that night involving her son and 
Mr. Garcia, involving her child and a beating situation. She felt 
it got a little bit out of hand as far as Mr. Garcia spanking her 
son and was very concerned for her own welfare and the child's 
welfare." Trial TR p 44. Hunt could see marks on the child and 
he called medical to respond. Trial TR p 45. Photographs of the 
child were taken at the hospital. Id. Hunt identified the 
photographs and "some of the welts and stuff that I observed on 
the small child." Id. Sgt Hunt testified that "basically the 
mark of the buckle itself along with the little gong that comes 
Page 12 of 25 
out that is used to secure the belt matched at least one of the 
marks that was on the small child." Trial TR p 47. Hunt 
"compared the belt" himself...and "also held the belt up next to 
the mark itself and had photographs taken to show that the two 
matched." Trial TR p 48. Hunt was asked whether the injuries he 
observed on the child appeared to be consistent with being made 
by the belt. He replied "yes." Id. 
Detective William D. Wentland, South Ogden Police Department 
also testified at trial. Wentland was called by Hunt on 
September 17, 2001, to the Garcia apartment. Wentland testified 
that he asked Garcia whether he had any questions about his 
Miranda rights, which he understood had been administered by 
Hunt, and if Garcia was 'willing to speak to us." Trial TR p 60. 
Garcia indicated he would speak with Wentland. Wentland 
testified that Garcia told him "himself and the child's mother 
and the child were eating dinner at the dinner table and that the 
child has refused to each (sic) some of the meat that was on his 
plate. At that time he took the child in the bedroom, pulled his 
pants down and spanked him with a belt on the buttock and as he 
did that, the child moved and he struck his leg several times." 
Id. According to Wentland, Garcia related a "second incident" 
in which Garcia said he "pulled the child's pants down and 
spanked him with a belt on the bed." Trial TR p 61. 
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Wentland testified, further, that when asked if he (Garcia) 
had "gone too far in disciplining the child" he, "at that point 
he admitted to me that he thought he had." Trial TR p 61. 
During the trial, defense counsel brought to the court's 
attention a concern raised by the defendant over testimony by one 
officer that he had given the defendant his Miranda warnings. 
According to the defendant, the first officer did not read him 
his "Miranda rights," rather, "the second officer did." Trial 
TR. P 70. The defendant was apparently concerned that statements 
made by him to the first officer were "being used against me 
now." Id. The defendant contended that the second officer was 
"...lying. If he went in the Court saying that he did not read 
me my rights, then he's lying." Trial TR p 71. Garcia alleged 
discrepancies in who administered the Miranda warnings, and other 
factual differences. Id. 
Garcia then took the stand and testified that Hassenrik and 
her son had been visiting with him for four or five days as of 
September 17, 2001. Trial TR at 74. Prior to that day, Garcia, 
Hassenrik and her son had taken a trip to Arizona, that "he had 
not been eating, that he hadn't eaten for the whole trip and he 
didn't eat the day before the trip." Trial TR at 74. According 
to Garcia, it had been "about five or five days" since the child 
had eaten. He instructed J.S. to eat and when J.S. did not eat, 
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Garcia warned him "you need to eat, you haven't eaten in days. 
If you don't eat, I'm going to have to spank you." Trial TR at 
75. When J.S. refused to eat, Garcia "escorted him to the 
bedroom and swatted him." Id. Garcia testified that he 
swatted J.S. two or three times with the belt on two occasions 
that night, and on the third occasion he took him to his room and 
put him to bed. Trial TR at 77. According to Garcia, he used 
the belt because he felt that if he hit him with his hand, he 
would "do more damage with my hand" than with the belt. He did 
not intend to cause physical injury to J.S. Trial TR at 77. 
Hassenrik returned to the stand and testified that J.S. had 
been eating, that he wasn't starving or going without proper 
nourishment and food. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Garcia argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict 
him of the class A misdemeanor Child Abuse, and that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel's 
refusal to pursue the impeachment of a witness who testified he 
did not read Garcia the Miranda warning when Garcia insisted he 
did so. Counsel has been unable to find a non-frivolous basis for 
the defendant's claims. For this reason, this brief is filed in 
accordance with the guidelines set forth in Anders v. California, 
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386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d (Utah 1981). 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Code section 76-5-109(3)(a) provides, in relevant part, 
that, 
Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, 
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits 
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of 
an offense as follows: (a) If done intentionally or 
knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor... . Utah 
law defines "physical injury" as "an injury to or condition 
of a child which impairs the physical condition of the 
child, including: (i) a bruise or other contusion of the 
skin... . U.C.A. §76-5-109(l)(c)... (c)(iv) any other 
condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and 
which is not a serious physical injury... 
This Court generally will not address a claim raised for 
the first time on appeal, absent a demonstration of plain error 
or exceptional circumstances. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 
P.3d 346. Garciafs challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
at this time obligates him to demonstrate "first, that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime(s) 
charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to 
the jury." Id. at 17. 
In State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 55 P.3d 1131, the court 
affirmed the jury's guilty verdict to child kidnaping, aggravated 
kidnaping and aggravated sexual abuse of an eight-year-old child. 
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The State presented evidence that the child was eight-year-old, 
that she was approached by a man asking for her assistance, that 
the child followed the man away from the location she had been 
left by her mother, that the defendant was the man who lured her 
away from the location, and that there was no other plausible 
reason for the defendant to lure her away. The Court reviewed 
the evidence presented by the State and concluded that there was 
nothing to suggest that "reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that [Diaz] committed the crime." Icl at f 36, 
citing State v. Holqate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346. 
In the instant case, the State's evidence included: 
(1) J.S. was born December 19, 1996. Garcia's conduct giving 
rise to the allegations occurred on September 17, 2001. 
J.S. was then four years and 8 months of age. 
(2) Garcia was Hassenrik's boyfriend. She and her son, J.S. 
resided with Garcia. Garcia assumed the role of 
disciplinarian. 
(3) On September 17, 2001, Garcia, Hassenrik and J.S. were at 
the dinner table and J.S. did not want to eat. 
(4) Garcia warned J.S. that if he didn't eat his food, Garcia 
would spank him. 
(5) J.S. did not eat his food and Garcia removed J.S. to the 
bedroom where he struck J.S. several times with a belt to 
discipline him for not eating his dinner. 
(6) Before J.S. was led into the bedroom by Garcia, he did not 
have marks and welts on his legs. 
(7) Garcia "swatted" J.S. several times with a belt. Garcia 
used the belt because he "felt if I hit him with my hand, 
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I'd do more damage with my hand than I would the belt." 
(8) Hassenrik could hear J.S. "crying and screaming" and she 
"knew that he was in trouble" when Garcia had J.S. in the 
bedroom. 
(9) Photographs of the marks on J.S.'s back and legs showed 
marks consistent with the shape of the belt and its 
buckle. 
(10) Law enforcement sought medical assistance for the child. 
It is impossible to argue that the foregoing evidence was 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
J.S. was a "child" as of September 17, 2001, that J.S. was in 
Garcia's care on that date, that Garcia intentionally or 
knowingly used a belt to inflict physical injury on J.S. or any 
other condition which imperils J.S.'s health or welfare. 
Inasmuch as it cannot be demonstrated that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction, it follows that there is no 
argument for an obvious and fundamental insufficiency such that 
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury. 
Garcia next argues that he was denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to 
pursue Garciafs contention that a witness lied in testifying that 
the witness administered Garcia his Miranda warnings. Garcia does 
not contend his Miranda warning was not administered and any 
statements made by him should have been suppressed. Garcia 
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claims he received his Miranda warning from the "second 
detective" rather than the first officer. 
To show that trial counsel was ineffective, Garcia must 
show: (1) counsel's performance was deficient below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 
12, 26 P.3d 203, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Trial counsel's conduct must fall 
outside a wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that 
is, "the defendant must overcome the presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound 
trial strategy. " " State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 139, 
(citations omitted). To establish "prejudice", Garcia must show 
a "reasonable probability...that except for the ineffective 
counsel, the result would have been different." Jd. quoting 
State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 27, 3 P.3d 777 (citations omitted). 
During the trial's recess, defense counsel brought to the 
trial court's attention Garcia's concerns about the testimony of 
one of the witnesses. Garcia reported to the court that the 
witness "lied" when he testified that it was the detective who 
had given the Miranda warning. According to Garcia, "then the 
second detective came, he introduced himself, he said I am 
Detective so-and-so, these are your Miranda rights, would you 
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like to talk to me." Trial TR p 66. Garcia stated he did not 
understand why "is everybody making a big old point to state that 
my Miranda rights were read by a certain officer that they were 
not?" Trial TR p 67. Garcia asserted that "if he (the witness) 
went in the court saying he did not read me my rights, then he's 
lying." During one exchange, the Court asked Garcia: 
Q: (Court) And you're telling me that he gave you your 
Miranda rights so what is the issue? 
A: (Garcia) He didn't he just stated that the (sic) 
didn't. He just stated on the record that he did 
not read me— 
Q: (Court) But you're telling me that he did. 
A: (Garcia) Yes sir, that's what happened. 
Q: (Court) Then there's no— 
A: (Garcia) But for the record. 
Q: (Court) I'm not going to argue— 
A: (Garcia) I just don't understand your honor. 
Trial TR p 72. 
At that point, trial counsel asked for additional time to 
talk with the defendant. At the conclusion of the recess, Garcia 
raised no further concerns about the officer's testimony, nor did 
he raise concerns about counsel's representation. Garcia did, 
however, elect to take the witness stand and testify. 
Page 20 of 25 
Taking the witness stand, Garcia testified that he 
instructed J.S. to eat, that when J.S. didn't eat he "escorted 
him to the bedroom and swatted him" with a belt "two or three 
times" and "it was two or three times on the first occasion." 
Trial TR p 75. Garcia then "warned him if you don't try the food 
then I'm going to have to spank you again." Trial TR p 76. J.S. 
did not eat and Garcia "escorted him to the bedroom again." Id. 
Garcia "swatted him two or three more times" with "the belt." 
Id. On cross examination, Garcia identified "one, two, three, 
four, five" marks from a photograph of J.S.'s legs. 
Even if counsel had cross examined the police officer as 
requested by the defendant and succeeded in discrediting all of 
his testimony, the most damaging testimony from Hunt would have 
consisted of his testimony of his conversation with Hassenrik 
during which she related that she was concerned for her own 
welfare and the welfare of the child, that Hassenrik explained 
there was an incident involving her child and a beating 
situation, his descriptions of the marks he observed on the child 
and his decision to call medical to respond. Hunt's testimony 
included his observations of the buckle and the comparison of the 
buckle to at least one of the marks on J.S. If the jury had 
discounted all of Hunt's testimony, it still cannot be argued 
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that the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that Garcia committed the offense. Excluding 
Hunt's testimony, the evidence would still show: 
(1) J.S. was born December 19, 1996. Garcia's conduct giving 
rise to the allegations occurred on September 17, 2001. 
J.S. was then four years and 8 months of age. 
(2) Garcia was Hassenrik's boyfriend. She and her son, J.S. 
resided with Garcia. Garcia assumed the role of 
disciplinarian. 
(3) On September 17, 2001, Garcia, Hassenrik and J.S. were at 
the dinner table and J.S. did not want to eat. 
(4) Garcia warned J.S. that if he didn't eat his food, Garcia 
would spank him. 
(5) J.S. did not eat his food and Garcia removed J.S. to the 
bedroom where he struck J.S. several times with a belt to 
discipline him for not eating his dinner. 
(6) Before J.S. was led into the bedroom by Garcia, he did not 
have marks and welts on his legs. 
(7) Garcia "swatted" J.S. several times with a belt. Garcia 
used the belt because he "felt if I hit him with my hand, 
I'd do more damage with my hand than I would the belt." 
(8) Hassenrik could hear J.S. "crying and screaming" and she 
"knew that he was in trouble" when Garcia had J.S. in the 
bedroom. 
(9) Photographs revealed marks on J.S.'s back and legs. 
Garcia does not content he did not receive his Miranda 
warning; Garcia does not claim counsel was deficient in failing 
to warn him against taking the stand in his defense. Garcia 
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claims that his trial attorney failed to ask important cross 
examination questions of a witness whof in Garcia's opinion, 
committed per jury when he testified he did not "read me my 
rights." 
Assume for the sake of argument that counsel's failure to 
cross examine the witness about his testimony that he did not 
give the Miranda warning as he testified did rise to the level of 
deficient performance such that counsel was not functioning as 
the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment• It is impossible 
to argue that the outcome of the trial would have been different 
had counsel succeeded in discrediting the witness and the jury 
ignored the police officer's complete testimony, and the court 
had suppressed all statements made by Garcia to the police 
officer. Hassenrik's testimony, Wentland's testimony and 
Garcia's own testimony provided sufficient evidence to support 
the conviction. 
Counsel has diligently examined the testimony at trial, 
the applicable statutory and case lawf and has been unable to 
find any law to support the Defendant's position. The Defendant 
expressed his desire to appeal the sufficiency of the evidence 
and trial counsel's failure to discredit one witness's testimony. 
For these reasons, counsel respectfully requests permission to 
withdraw from further representation of the Defendant. 
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Counsel has complied with the requirements set forth in 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Clayton, 
639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). Counsel attempted contact with 
the defendant by mail to his last know home address on March 7, 
2005 but the defendant did not respond. Counsel hand-delivered a 
copy of this brief to the Weber County Correctional Facility for 
delivery to the defendant on March 17, 2005 and was advised by 
facility staff that the document had been delivered, however the 
brief was returned on March 24, 2005 and counsel learned that the 
defendant had, in fact, been released from that facility. A 
final attempt to deliver the brief by certified mail to the last 
known address of the defendant failed when the brief was returned 
on April 4, 2005 "unable to forward." 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel is unable to find any non-frivolous issues to 
appeal. For this reason, counsel respectfully requests this 
Court to release her as appellate counsel. 
DATED this t day of /Wl , 2005. 
mjjtt^ 
Sharon S. Sipes 
Attorney for Appellant 
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